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Global Business over Time
Geoffrey Jones
This article surveys the current state of research on the origins and development
of global business. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, firms have been the strongest
institution to operate across national borders. Multinational firms, defined as firms owning
and controlling assets in more than one country, have been major drivers of the trade and
capital flows which have characterized the globalization waves since the middle decades of
the nineteenth century（Jones,２００５; Jones,２０１４）.
Figure１ provides a visual representation of these globalization waves. The metric
of cross-border integration aggregates capital, trade and migration flows.
It should be emphasized that Figure１ is a pictorial representation of the overall
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historical pattern. It makes no claim to be based on statistical estimates―it would be chal-
lenging to formulate a data series which combines trade, capital, and migration. It does not
claim that there was zero international trade, capital flow or migration in １８４０. Indeed
globalization could be legitimately traced back to when homo sapiens migrated from Africa
about８０，０００years ago.（Jones, ２０１３）Rather the point is that from１８４０s the scale of inter-
national trade, capability, and migration intensified, increasingly integrating different regions
of the world（Bordo, Taylor and Williamson,２００３）.
The first wave of globalization stumbled during World War I. There were new con-
trols on trade. The Gold Standard was suspended. A surge of racism resulted on ethnicity-
based restrictions on migration flows in the United States, Australia and elsewhere. The
Wall Street Crash in １９２９ resulted in the collapse of the first global economy as tariffs and
exchange controls massively reduced capital and trade flows. While international trade in-
creased again from the１９５０s, migration and capital movements remained subdued until the
end of the １９７０s. Large parts of the world, including the Soviet Union and the People’s Re-
public of China, excluded global firms and international trade. Subsequently capital flows
and international trade rose very quickly, although migration flows were much less. This
second global economy was ended by the global financial crisis in ２００８. Enhanced regula-
tions, a huge increase in non-tariff barriers, and other restrictions resulted in trade and capi-
tal flows becoming subdued. Within a decade anti-globalization populist movements had
come to power in multiple countries entirely changing the policy context in which global
firms worked.
The following five sections will consider the role of global firms in each of the
chronological eras of globalization. A final section concludes.
Global Business and the First Globalization Wave １８４０―１９２９
From the mid-nineteenth century thousands of firms, largely based in Western
countries which had experienced the Industrial Revolution, established operations in foreign
countries. Merchant houses and banks were among the first businesses to become multina-
tional. The search for raw materials and food led firms abroad too. The first instances of
multinational manufacturing included small Swiss cotton textile firms in the １８３０s（Jones
and Schro¨ter, １９９３）. The phenomenon intensified from mid-century. Multinational manufac-
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Table １. World Foreign Direct Investment as a Percentage of World Output １９１３―２０１０（%）
１９１３ １９６０ １９８０ １９９０ ２０１０
９．０ ４．４ ４．８ ９．６ ３０．３
Source: Jones,２０１４.
turing was stimulated by the spread of protectionism from the late nineteenth century.
Firms were able to“jump”over the tariff barriers which blocked their exports by establish-
ing local production. This strategy was prominent in industries such as chemicals, machin-
ery and branded consumer products.
As Table１ shows, foreign direct investment（FDI）rose to a percentage of world
output which it would not reach again until １９９０. These firms drove the rapid increase in
trade flows during this era. Latin America and Asia were especially important as host
economies, attracting well over half of the total world stock of foreign direct investment.
Possibly one half of world FDI was invested in natural resources, and a further one-third in
services, especially financing, insuring, transporting commodities and foodstuffs（Wilkins,
１９７０; Jones,２００５a; Dunning and Lundan,２００８）.
The firms of different countries varied in their propensity to invest abroad. Britain
alone was the home of nearly one half of world FDI in１９１４, and the United States and Ger-
many accounted for a further １４ percent each. Firms from a number of small European
countries, especially the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, were very active internation-
ally（Jones and Schro¨ter, １９９３）. During the first global economy, the fact that the majority
of FDI was in natural resources and related services, meant that the biggest host economies
were countries of recent settlement and primary producers in the periphery. A listing of the
ten largest host economies in １９２９ included India, Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Malaya
and Venezuela. FDI in these countries was overwhelmingly in resources and services.
Manufacturing FDI went to three other countries―Canada and the United States in first
and second place, and Britain in eighth place. Canada and the United States also attracted
considerable FDI in resources（Wilkins,１９９４）.
The spread of global firms rested crucially on the overall political economy of the
period. The expansion of Western Imperialism over much of Asia and Africa, the spread of
an international legal system and legal norms which enforced contracts and private prop-
erty rights, numerous trade treaties, and the international Gold Standard, reduced the risks
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of doing business abroad, primarily for firms from the West. After tariffs rose in the United
States and Europe from the middle of the nineteenth century, business enterprises
“jumped” over them to create multinational manufacturing operations （Magee and
Thompson, ２０１０; Fitzgerald, ２０１５）. Access to capital was facilitated by the growth of large
globally-oriented capital markets in London and elsewhere. Trading in commodities was fa-
cilitated by the rapid growth of futures markets in the second half of the century. Transport
and communication innovation was vital too. The advent of steam driven railroads from the
１８３０s, and faster sailing ships and then steamships, shank geographical distance. The discov-
ery of the principles of electricity was vital too. It permitted the revolution in communica-
tion costs caused by the invention of the electric telegraph. Although the impact of the tele-
graph was not immediate, as submarine technology was so expensive it was mainly used by
governments and large firms.（Mu¨ller, ２０１６）. Over an extended period time it became fun-
damental in enabling the boundaries of firms to expand, inside countries and then over bor-
ders. It made formal managerial control over distant operations much easier（Jones,２０１４）.
The growth of global firms was enabled by innovation in organizational structures
which reduced the risks of operating internationally. There was constant experimentation
with organizational design, and the organizational forms employed were heterogeneous. As
described by Chandler, the nineteenth century saw the creation of large firms with manage-
rial hierarchies（Chandler,１９６２; Chandler,１９７７; Chandler,１９９０）. Many began as small entre-
preneurial ventures, but a handful became global giants. Singer Sewing Machines was one
example. By １９１４ it accounted for ９０ percent of the sewing machines built in the world.
Singer’s development of installment plans and direct selling enabled millions of relatively
low income consumers from Russia to Japan to purchase the machine（Carstensen, １９８４,
Godley,２００６; Gordon２０１１）.
Singer, and other large firms such as Standard Oil and Lever Brothers, co-existed
with numerous small and family-owned firms. European firms, especially from smaller econo-
mies such as Sweden, made foreign investments at early stages of their corporate lives
（Olsson, １９９３）. Thousands of“free-standing”firms, which conducted little or no business in
their home economies, were established in Britain and the Netherlands especially, exclu-
sively to operate internationally（Wilkins and Schro¨ter, １９９８）. These free-standing firms
were once seen as inferior to US-style managerial hierarchies. In her path-breaking article
on the subject, Wilkins observed their“high mortality rate”and the managerial challenges
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of a“tiny head office.（Wilkins １９８８, pp. ２７１, ２７７）. However subsequent research found
them to have often been robust, employing socialization methods of control in place of for-
mal bureaucracy. In many cases free-standing firms were not genuinely free-standing at all,
but formed parts of clusters of businesses, or business groups organized around trading
companies（Jones,１９９８,２０００）.
Merchant networks established by diaspora communities were also important driv-
ers of global business. The Greek diaspora spread over the Mediterranean, and Russia was
active in wide-ranging international commercial and shipping business, creating a cosmopoli-
tan business network based on kinship ties extending over central Europe and even reach-
ing France and Britain（Minoglou and Louri, １９９７）. In Asia, Chinese and Indian commercial
diaspora operated within and between European empires（Brown, １９９４, ２０００; Fitzgerald,
２０１５）.
The minority of firms which survived the challenge of global operations long
enough to build viable businesses drove globalization by creating trade flows, constructing
marketing channels, building infrastructure, and creating markets. By １９１４ the production
or marketing of most of the world’s mineral resources was controlled by US and European
firms. Foreign firms also dominated the production and marketing of renewable resources
including rubber, tropical fruits and tea. A high proportion of world trade in primary com-
modities was intra-firm. The commodity chains created by these firms were fundamental ac-
tors in the process of world economic integration.（Topik, Marichal, and Frank,２００６）
Much of the infrastructure of the global economy―the telegraph, ports, railroads,
and electricity and gas utilities―was also put in place by international business enterprises
（Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, ２００８; Geyikdagi, ２０１１; Fitzgerald, ２０１５）. International ship-
ping companies carried the world’s oceanic trade and moved millions of people（Harlaftis
and Theokokas ２００４; Munro ２００３）. Trading companies both facilitated and created trade
flows between developed and developing countries, often investing in creating plantations
and opening mines, and the processing of minerals and commodities.（Jones, １９９８, ２０００;
Jonker and Sluyterman, ２０００）European overseas banks built extensive branch networks
throughout the Southern Hemisphere and Asia, and financed the exchange of manufactured
goods for commodities（Jones,１９９３）.
World War I was a major economic and political shock for global firms. The expro-
priation of German-owned affiliates by US, British and other Allied governments not only
―― Global Business over Time ―― ５
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｂ 2018.02.07 13.36.44 Page 5
virtually reduced the stock of German FDI to zero, but also signaled the end of the era
when foreign companies could operate in most countries on the same terms as domestic
ones. The Russian Revolution in １９１７ resulted in France and Belgium losing two-thirds of
their total foreign investment.（Jones,２０１３; Fitzgerald,２０１５）.
Yet multinational investment resumed during the １９２０s, even if short-term and
speculative capital flows became much more prominent in the world economy. The giant
American mining company the Guggenheim Brothers made very large investments in Mex-
ico, Chile and elsewhere. There were large foreign investments during that decade by US
automobile manufacturers Ford and General Motors. The Swedish Match Company, led by
Ivar Kreuger, consolidated the fragmented match industry and by １９３０ controlled ４０ per
cent of the world match market. By then the company also owned other Swedish multina-
tionals, including the electrical company Ericsson, ball bearing manufacturer SKF and the
mining company Boliden. Yet the experience of Swedish Match also reflected the new fragil-
ity of the global economy. After the mid-１９２０s, the company raised capital on the Americans
stock exchange and lent it to sovereign governments in Europe and elsewhere unable to fi-
nance their deficits in the capital markets. In １９３２, after Ivar Kreuger’s suicide, it was dis-
covered that Swedish Match’s growth had rested on systemic accounting fraud.（Jones,
２００５）
The impact of these global firms was considerable. Multinational manufacturing
companies transferred products and brands across borders during this era of fast globaliza-
tion. Bayer introduced the aspirin to the United States. There were hundreds of other exam-
ples.（Wilkins, １９８９）Firms which built factories in foreign countries transferred new tech-
niques and work practices. Beginning with a factory in Glasgow, Scotland, in １８６７, Singer
took mechanized sewing machine manufacture around the world. In Tsarist Russia, it built
the largest modern engineering factory in the country, employing German and British man-
agers to supervise both the production process and new methods of labor management.
（Carstensen, １９８４）. Companies also transferred the values behind brands. For example, the
international growth of the beauty industry drove a worldwide homogenization of beauty
ideals and practices. The features and habits of White people became established as the
benchmarks of global beauty（Jones,２０１０）.
Technology transfer was not limited to multinational manufacturing. The establish-
ment and maintenance of mines, oil fields, plantations, shipping depots, and railroad systems
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involved the transfer of packages of organizational and technological knowledge to host
economies. The Guggenheims moved mining technologies developed in the United States to
their businesses in Mexico and Chile. They also collaborated with other mining companies,
such as Sweden’s Boliden, to exchange technology（Bergquist and Lindmark, ２０１６）. Given
the absence of appropriate infrastructure in many countries, foreign enterprises frequently
not only introduced technologies specific to their activities, but also social technologies such
as police, postal and education systems（Jones, ２０００）. In some cases they created entire
towns: an example was Ford Motor Company’s ultimately unsuccessful Fordlandia started
in Brazil in １９２８.（Wilkins and Hill, １９６４, pp. １６９―７０, １７６―８, １８４）The building of transport
and distribution infrastructure enabled entrepreneurs to access world markets for the first
time. In so far as access to markets had been a constraint on capitalist enterprise in many
parts of the world, this relieved it. However there were also huge costs. The movement of
crops and plants around the world resulted in massive losses of biodiversity and other envi-
ronmental damage beginning a process of environmental degradation which has yet to be
reversed.（Jones,２０１７）
There was, therefore, considerable potential for global firms to facilitate the closing
of the wealth gap which had opened up as Western Europe and North America underwent
industrialization from the nineteenth century, whilst the rest of the world did not, and lost
once large craft industries. In practice, this did not happen, except in isolated incidences.
Knowledge spillovers from multinational investment to the non-Western world were limited.
Technological diffusion worked best when foreign firms went to a country with the institu-
tional arrangements, human capital and entrepreneurial values to absorb transferred knowl-
edge, much of which was tacit and not readily codified（Bruland and Mowery,２０１４）. Conse-
quently, while the first global economy saw multinational firms become the conduits for sig-
nificant technological and organizational transfers from the United States to Western
Europe, and Western Europe to the United States, their role in transferring knowledge and
capabilities from the West to the rest of the world was more modest. Global firms can be
seen as part of the explanation for the convergence of technologies and incomes within the
West, and the lack of convergence between the West and the rest.（Harley２０１４）.
Both the strategies of global firms and their management practices contributed to
this situation. Most FDI in developing countries was in resources and related services.
These natural resource investments were highly enclavist. Minerals and agricultural com-
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modities were typically exported with only the minimum of processing. This meant that
most value was added to the product in the developed economies. Foreign firms were large
employers of labor at that time. However, expatriates were typically employed in the higher
skill jobs（Piquet,２００４）. As a result, the diffusion of organizing and technological skills to de-
veloping host economies was far less than to developed economies. Certainly some develop-
ing countries, such as Mexico, experienced significant economic growth before World War I,
as foreign firms developed and exported minerals and commodities, and built the railroads
and ports that allowed them access to foreign markets（Allen,２０１４）. However on the whole,
and with exceptions, Western firms in Mexico were not significant agents of technological
diffusion into the domestic economy, given the formidable institutional, social and cultural
roadblocks in face of the transfer of technologies from advanced economies（Beatty, ２００３,
２００９）.
In the broadest sense, many of the gains from the first global economy had not
been evenly shared. This was most clearly seen in the cases of the huge natural resource
concessions which colonial regimes and assorted dictators had granted to Western firms. In
order to entice firms to make investments in mines, railroads, and so on, foreign firms were
often given large, long-term and tax-free concessions by governments in Latin America and
elsewhere. These concessions turned Western companies into supporters of repressive gov-
ernments, and associated Western capitalism with dictatorships and colonial regimes.（Jones,
２０１３）Global capitalism had flourished within the context of Western colonialism, and be-
came associated with the political and racial injustice of such regimes. In interwar India, for
example, Gandhi’s campaign against British imperialism encompassed a wider criticism of
global capitalism as a whole（Tripathi,２００４; Nanda,２００３）.
During the last decades of the first global economy income gaps increased not only
between the West and the Rest, but also within countries. Global firms were significant driv-
ers of this story. As commodity exports surged in Latin America, income inequality soared
as the owners of land became wealthy（Williamson, ２０１０）. Meanwhile mining and other ex-
tractive Western companies employed thousands of local people typically paid low wages
and offered few avenues for improvement. The creators and owners of large global corpora-
tions in the United States（and Europe）also became hugely wealthy. This contributed to
the huge rise in income inequality seen evident by the early １９００s（Piketty, ２０１４）. Inequal-
ity and unfairness prompted the growth of labor movements and socialist parties. In １９１７
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the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia, and proceeded to abolish capitalism. Global firms
such as Singer Sewing Machines and Shell lost their large assets in the country.
Global Business in the Era of De-globalization １９２９―１９７９
Global firms encountered numerous challenges after １９２９ as liberal policy regimes
gave way to numerous government restrictions on trade, capital flows, and migration. If the
management of geographical distance had been a major managerial challenge before the
１９２０s, the management of governments and their policies rose sharply up corporate agendas
subsequently（Jones and Lubinski, ２０１２）. Between１９２９and１９３８the real value of world ex-
ports declined by９．４per cent. By the end of the１９３０s half of world trade was affected by
tariffs. There was no recovery to １９２９ levels until after World War II. The integration of
world markets went into reverse（Fitzgerald,２０１５）.
This changed policy regime happened despite the fact that transport and communi-
cation innovations continued to reduce the costs of geographical distance. Telephones and
automobiles became items of mass consumption, especially in the United States. Air travel
became quite widespread, if costly. The advent of cinema and radio also provided unprece-
dented opportunities to see lifestyles real or imagined elsewhere, and facilitated the further
diffusion of cultural influences（Grazia, ２００５）. Yet as technology facilitated human beings to
travel and observe one another as never before, so they disliked what they saw. Nationalism
and racism proliferated. Governments sought to block foreign companies, alongside foreign
imports and capital flows, and immigrants.
The nationality of firms rose rapidly up political agendas after World War１, and re-
ceptivity to foreign firms did not recover after the end of the war. Although the United
States shifted from being the world’s largest debtor nation to being a net creditor over the
course of the World War１, this was accompanied by a growing nationalism which resulted
in major restrictions on foreign ownership in shipping, telecommunications, resources and
other industries（Wilkins,２００２; Wilkins,２００４）. The world became, and remained, much risk-
ier for firms crossing national borders.
After the end of World War II, the spread of Communism, decolonization and sub-
sequent growth of restrictions on foreign firms, and widespread nationalization of foreign-
owned natural resource investments in the developing world, combined to dramatically re-
―― Global Business over Time ―― ９
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｂ 2018.02.07 13.36.44 Page 9
duce foreign investments beyond the West. By１９８０ the six largest hosts for FDI were the
United States, Britain, Canada, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Brazil, the first devel-
oping economy was in seventh place. Australia, Indonesia and Italy followed（Dunning and
Lundan,２００８; Jones,２０１４）.
Although capital flows, trade flows and migration flows all fell sharply, global busi-
ness did not disappear during these decades. A number of nationalistic regimes blocked new
foreign investment, and squeezed existing foreign-owned businesses. However, Nazi Ger-
many, while it used exchange controls to block profit remittances, exercised few restrictions
on foreign businesses beyond requiring that they excluded Jews and others considered un-
desirable from the management of affiliates in Germany. As a result, US and other foreign
firms such as General Motors and IBM were able to sustain growing businesses, albeit ones
whose profits they needed to plough back into their German operations, and as a result con-
tribute to strengthening the Nazi state（Wilkins, １９７４; Turnerm ２００５）. Meanwhile consum-
ers in Nazi Germany continued to watch the same Hollywood movies and purchase the
same American cosmetic brands, as their counterparts in the United States（Grazia, ２００５;
Jones, ２０１０）. More generally, the ability of multinationals to finance their subsidiaries by
ploughing back profits, or lending from local banks, meant that their businesses were much
less impacted by the interwar collapse of capital flows than might have been expected.
Business enterprises were more robust than an aggregate view of markets would
suggest. From the perspective of firms, globalization was constrained rather than totally re-
versed. During the１９２０s German firms rebuilt international businesses（Jones and Lubinski,
２０１２）. In interwar Great Britain, as elsewhere, there were significant divestments as manu-
facturing multinationals closed down their affiliates, but there were at least as many new en-
trants（Bostock and Jones, １９９４; Jones and Bostock, １９９６）. US and other firms in fast-grow-
ing consumer products such as automobiles―and component industries such as tires―in-
vested heavily in manufacturing in foreign markets（Fitzgerald, ２０１５）. There were strong
continuities, rather than massive disruption, in the global maritime world of shipping, trad-
ing and ports（Miller,２０１１）. Despite an era of falling commodity and mineral prices, multina-
tional companies made vast investments developing new sources of supply, such as copper
mines in east Africa and the Belgian Congo, and petroleum in Venezuela（Jones,２００５a）.
Numerous international cartels strove to regulate prices and output on a global
scale. By the １９３０s a high percentage of world trade was controlled by such international
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cartels. In manufacturing, the world electric lamp cartel controlled three-fourths of world
output of electric lamps between the mid-１９２０s and World War II（Reich １９９２）. Commodi-
ties such as oil, tin and tea saw wide-ranging and quite long-lasting international cartels.
While they may be seen as part of the story of growth-retarding institutions during this era,
it is evident that most cartels were rarely able to control them for too long before new com-
petitors appeared, unless they were strongly supported by governments. More importantly,
however, they were often not agents of de-globalization. They often represented competition
by another means rather than the elimination of competition altogether. They were some-
times powerful actors in the transfer of knowledge and intellectual property across borders
（Fear,２００８）.
Global firms faced much greater restrictions after World War II. The Communist
states of the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and China excluded capitalist firms from their
borders. The Communist world resembled an“alternative”global economy, but one without
capitalist firms, at least until the deterioration of political relations between China and the
Soviet Union halted attempts at economic integration（Kirby, ２００６）. Yet, even here, global
firms kept marginal presences. In consumer products such as hair care, Western firms sold
ingredients to Soviet and other eastern European state-owned firms from at least the１９７０s,
and sometimes licensed their technology also（Jones,２０１０）.
Leaving aside the Communist countries, much of the world restricted or banned
foreign companies in some or all industries. In European and many other developed coun-
tries, tight exchange controls enabled governments to vet or sometimes prohibit invest-
ments from other firms. In major European economies such as France, Britain and Italy,
large swathes of industry were nationalized and taken out of capitalist control, domestic or
foreign. The United States was broadly more open to foreign firms, although they were
blocked from sectors considered strategic, including defense, airlines and broadcasting
（Wilkins,２００２）.
In the postcolonial world, the restrictions on global capitalism were much greater.
In both Africa and Asia there was widespread restriction and expropriation of foreign firms.
Entrepots and colonial outposts which remained open to foreign multinationals, such as Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong, experienced rapid economic growth, although their equally success-
ful“Newly Industrializing Countries”（NIC）counterparts South Korea and Taiwan adopted
Japanese-style restrictions on wholly-owned foreign companies. During the １９７０s Western
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firms lost ownership of much of the world’s natural resources, as Middle Eastern and other
governments expropriated assets. Within the non-Western world, there was enormous con-
centration of FDI flows. In Asia, there was no FDI in China, and almost none in Japan and
India（Jones,２００５a）.
Global Business and the Origins of the Second Global Economy １９４５―１９７９
After World War II ended, global firms made significant contributions to the recon-
struction of a global economy. Service firms such as management consultants, advertising
agencies, hotels and film distributors served as significant conduits for the international dif-
fusion of American management practices, values and lifestyles（West, １９８７; Quek, ２０１２）.
However their activities involved limited capital investment compared to manufacturing or
mining. This meant that their growing importance could not be captured by FDI figures.
This was one reason why levels of FDI remained well below their pre-１９１４peaks.
As US management consultancies, such as McKinsey, globalized from the late
１９５０s, they both created and served markets for consultancy services. They diffused mana-
gerial best practice from the United States, initially primarily to Western Europe where
they opened branches（Kipping,１９９９; McKenna,２００６）. Trading companies developed global
networks exploiting information asymmetries. Japan’s general trading companies（sogo
shosha）survived their dismantling by the Allied occupation after World War II to become
the central drivers of Japan’s foreign trade and FDI（Yonekawa,１９９０）.
Long-established European trading companies, many of whom had had their busi-
nesses devastated during the war, were also rebuilt and re-invented. Jardine Matheson and
Swire, for example, lost their substantial assets in China after the１９４９Revolution. However
they developed new businesses in the British colony of Hong Kong and elsewhere in the re-
gion, building and operating ports, wharves, and shipping companies, and creating airlines.
Swire’s development of Cathay Pacific created, by the１９６０s, a major airline which facilitated
regional economic integration（Jones,２０００）.
Shipping firms were especially important actors in the postwar growth boom. They
carried the bulk of international trade, including much of the energy, raw materials and food
that the Western world and Japan required. A new generation of Greek ship-owners, headed
by Aristotle Onassis and Stavros Niarchos, built new bulk shipping companies, taking advan-
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tage of regulatory arbitrage opportunities by, for example, registering ships using flags of
convenience, and basing themselves in tax havens such as Monaco（Harlaftis,１９９３,２０１４）.
Multinational banking also assumed a new importance（Jones, １９９３）. As British
overseas banks and US banks took advantage of the Bank of England’s liberal policies to-
wards foreign exchange markets during the late １９５０s, the development of the Eurodollar
markets in London provided a dynamic new source of funding for global capitalism. In the
interests of financial stability, governments had sought to tightly regulate their financial
markets since the Great Depression, and had separated them from each another by ex-
change controls. The new unregulated Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets soon began to
capture a rising share of financial intermediation from regulated domestic markets. The new
financial markets were global in scope, but physically located in a small number of financial
centers, of which London stood at the apex, and in offshore centers where the primary at-
traction was not the size of domestic markets, but a combination of regulations and fiscal
conditions, and political stability（Jones,１９９２; Roberts,１９９４; Schenk,２００１,２０１１; Ogle,２０１７）.
The commercial and investment banks in the new Euro markets innovated finan-
cial products on an accelerating scale with the tacit, and later explicit, support of the British
and US governments（Helleiner, １９９４）. However the financiers who created these markets
also subverted the strategies of governments to closely regulate their financial markets. In
some instances, such as the British merchant bank Warburg, they were explicitly motivated
by political and economic ambitions to erode national sovereignties and foster European in-
tegration（Ferguson,２００９）.
The physical location of international financial markets in a few geographies formed
part of a wider pattern of the concentration of business activity in certain cities and regions
during the postwar decades. The advantages of proximity and agglomeration drove such
patterns. While such clustering had always been a feature of the world economy, the grow-
ing importance of knowledge, and knowledge workers, intensified the trend. This was evi-
dent in the origins of the Silicon Valley technology cluster during the １９５０s and １９６０s,
where an unusual convergence of technological skills, educational institutions, and venture
capital led to the creation of multiple entrepreneurial firms which were to dominate innova-
tion in many parts of the IT industry for the remainder of the century（Le´cuyer,２００５）.
During the １９５０s, most of the international cartels of the interwar years were dis-
mantled, while U.S. manufacturing companies invested on a large scale in Western Europe,
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initially in response to the“dollar shortage,”which encouraged U.S. firms to establish facto-
ries to supply customers in countries that lacked the dollars to buy American products
（Wilkins, １９７４）. There was initially little rationalized production, and intra-firm trade was
low. However, from the １９６０s, firms began to seek geographical and functional integration
across borders. The process of building integrated production systems was difficult. While a
European company such as Unilever was a prominent proponent of European economic inte-
gration from the １９５０s, it struggled to achieve regional integration of their own production
and marketing facilities（Jones and Miskell,２００５）.
The postwar decades were the classic era of the Chandlerian large corporation
managed by professional managers, which served as powerhouses of innovation in many
manufacturing industries, especially in the United States. US-based firms were pre-eminent
in new technologies, and they sought to maintain innovation and other value-added activities
within firm boundaries. In the computer industry, for example, it proved impossible for
western European firms, let alone those from developing countries, to build sustainable busi-
nesses. Advanced knowledge was locked within the boundaries of such large Western cor-
porations, as well as geographical clusters such as Silicon Valley.
Global business also often changed its form, rather than disappearing, and resilience
remained a prominent feature. Whilst foreign ownership of natural resources vastly de-
clined, especially during the１９７０s, foreign orchestration of commodity trade flows and domi-
nance of higher value added activities did not. World trade in commodities was increasingly
handled by giant commodity trading firms such as Cargill, the grain trader and largest pri-
vate company in the United States（Broehl, １９９２, １９９８）. While large integrated oil compa-
nies lost control of their oil fields in many countries, they kept control of refineries, tankers,
and distribution facilities. New forms of independent trading companies emerged as key
players in the global economy. A number of the most important, including Andre and
Philipp Brothers were either based in Switzerland or used Swiss-based affiliates to book
most of their transactions. Switzerland offered a low tax environment and corporate se-
crecy, with the added benefit of not belonging to the United Nations（Guez, １９９８）. This en-
abled the companies to trade with governments, such as that of apartheid-era South Africa,
subject to trade embargoes. The most noteworthy example was the trading house of Marc
Rich, founded in１９７４by disgruntled former employees of Philipp Brothers, which had reve-
nues of $１５ billion by １９８０. It flourished as the world’s largest independent oil trader by
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clandestinely selling Iranian oil to Israel and South Africa（Ammann,２００９）.
Firms proved adept at pursuing strategies to respond to anti-foreign sentiments or
critical governmental policies. They assumed local identities. In １９４７ Sears, the U.S. depart-
ment store chain, started a successful business in Mexico, a country which had only a dec-
ade earlier expelled foreign oil companies and was widely regarded as highly nationalistic.
Sears carefully crafted its strategy to appeal to Mexicans, representing policies such as
profit-sharing, pensions and low priced meals as in the traditions of the Mexican Revolution
（Moreno, ２００３）. Unilever retained its large consumer goods business in India, and other
emerging markets such as Turkey, by means of employing local nationals in senior manage-
ment positions, selling equity shares to local investors, and investing in industries deemed
desirable by governments, such as chemicals in India（Jones,２００５b, Jones,２０１３）.
Multinationals also learned that interventionist government policies could work in
their favor. In Latin America, postwar governments imposed high tariffs to achieve import
substitution manufacturing, but they did not prohibit ownership of industries by foreign
firms. The Brazilian and other Latin American governments offered incentives to attract
foreign firms to build manufacturing facilities. Although such import substitution strategies
have since been widely derided, in part as they became associated with the chronic macro-
economic mismanagement which resulted in hyperinflation in Brazil and elsewhere during
the１９７０s and１９８０s, they resulted in the building of much new industrial capacity.
A striking example was the creation of a large automobile industry in Brazil from
the late１９５０s. While the U.S. automobile giants Ford and General Motors initially refused to
respond to the government’s desire to start local production, the upstart German car maker
VW began local manufacturing, benefitting from exchange rate subsidies. It was able to rap-
idly overturn the large market share of the U.S. firms which had relied upon importing
knock-down kits for assembly. By １９８０ Volkswagen, eventually joined by the leading U.S.
and other firms, had given Brazil an annual production of over one million vehicles a year,
making the country the world’s tenth largest automobile industry. The downside was ex-
cess capacity and low productivity, but VW and the other firms had also laid the basis for
the sub-continent’s largest automobile industry（Shapiro,１９９４）.
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Global Business and the Second Global Economy １９７９―２００８
As the world spectacularly re-globalized from the １９８０s, among the most dramatic
changes was the worldwide policy embrace of global capitalism. State planning, exchange
controls and other instruments of interventionist policies were abandoned. Instead, practi-
cally every government on the planet eventually came to offer incentives for global firms to
invest. The most spectacular change came in China which, after １９７８, opened its economy
once more to global firms. In２００１China’s joined the World Trade Organization（WTO）, re-
sulting in significant cuts in Chinese tariffs. Just over ten years later the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union re-opened eastern Europe to global business. In
some federal systems, such as the United States, individual states competed with one an-
other to attract foreign investors.
The role of global business in the growth and dynamics of the second global econ-
omy is considerable. The ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP rose in the world from ９．６ per
cent to ３０．３ per cent between １９９０ and ２０１０. The same increase applied to the developed
world as a whole, but there were outliers, In Britain, inward FDI stock rose from ２０．１ per
cent of GDP to ４８．４ per cent between １９９０ and ２０１０. In the developing world as a whole
the ratio increased from１３．４per cent to２９．１per cent, but again there were outliers. In In-
dia the ratio of inward FDI stock rose from a very low ０．５ per cent in １９９０ to a much
higher１２．０per cent in２０１０. In China, it rose from５．１per cent to９．９per cent（UNCTAD,
２０１１）.
As during the fast globalization during the late nineteenth century, global firms
were drivers of economic integration. Multinational investment grew far faster than world
exports or world output. International production systems developed within which firms lo-
cated different parts of their value chain across the globe. In some industries such produc-
tion systems became highly externalized through outsourcing.
There was a striking globalization of many services. These included insurance and
re-insurance, where firms such as AIG, Allianz and Swiss Re expanded globally. In leisure
and retailing, the coffee chain Starbucks, which made its first investment outside the United
States in Japan in １９９６, and retail companies such as Wal-Mart, Zara and Uniqlo became
symbolic of the new global era. In media, News Corporation built a newspaper, movie, televi-
sion, and cable business with large market shares in Australia, Britain, India and the United
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States（Fitzgerald,２０１５; Hauter and Jones,２０１７）.
The global significance of firms based beyond North America, Western Europe and
Japan also rose. During the１９６０s and１９７０s, some manufacturers from South Korea and Tai-
wan began to invest abroad, typically in other emerging markets. They were usually small-
scale and used labor-intensive technology. A second wave of firms, based in both Asia and
Latin America, began to expand globally from the１９８０s, often after they had built scale and
corporate competences in their protected domestic markets. They were prominent in as-
sembly-based and knowledge-based industries including electronics, automobiles and tele-
communications. These investments often originated from firms embedded in the business
groups which characterized emerging markets, including the Korean chaebol and the grupos
economicos in Latin America.（Amsden, ２００３; Kosacoff, ２００２; Khanna and Palepu, ２００６; Bar-
bero,２０１４）.
The ability of firms from emerging markets to become significant actors in global
capitalism rested on several factors. They were sometimes able to piggyback on incumbent
Western or Japanese firms as customers through subcontracting and other linkages
（Mathews, ２００２）. The spread of management education, as well as the growing number of
international students at leading U.S. business schools, provided firms outside the developed
core with well-trained and globally-minded managers. Finally there was a new generation of
state-owned, or partly-owned firms, which could invest in building global businesses without
the constraint of having to deliver private shareholder returns. The growth of state-owned
firms was particularly evident in China, where state support enabled highly competitive lo-
cal firms to emerge even in high-technology sectors. Examples included Huawei, the internet
networking firm, and wind and solar energy firms such as Xinjiang Goldwind. The number
of Chinese companies among the global top ten turbine manufacturers went from zero to
four between ２００６ and ２０１０.（Buckley, Voss, Cross and Clegg, ２０１１; Clifford, ２０１５; Jones,
２０１７）.
The dynamic growth of global firms, drawn from a widening range of home coun-
tries, was apparent. There remained little or no aggregate evidence of spillovers from multi-
national firms to local firms in the same sector, especially in developing countries, although
there was evidence of positive linkages between multinationals and suppliers. Foreign affili-
ates were often more demanding in their specifications and delivery targets, while more
willing to provide assistance and advice to local firms. Multinationals continued to have no
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incentive to encourage knowledge leakages to competitors. In many developing countries, lo-
cal firms also still lacked the capabilities to compete with large multinationals, and the
greater the technology gap, the more difficult this gap was to fill.（Alfaro and Rodriquez-
Claire, ２００４）. Governments sought to attract foreign firms and create whole industries by
designating free trade areas or export processing zones. Most export processing zones,
whether in Asia, Africa or Latin America, have failed to attract more than the low value
added, low-skill, segments of industry value chains（Steinfield, ２００４; Cling, Razafindrakoto,
and Roubaud,２００５）.
As global firms moved resources across borders in pursuit of profitability opportu-
nities, they also continued to reinforce trends more than counter them. Despite the availabil-
ity of technologies which permit the dispersal of economic activities, global firms served as
major actors in the clustering of higher value-added activities in“global cities”and regions
such as Silicon Valley and Bangalore. A significant difference with earlier eras may have
been that US firms started to“outsource”domestic jobs to foreign countries. Apple, for ex-
ample, outsourced manufacturing of its iconic iPhone to the Taiwanese company Foxconn,
which produced them in China. In２０１６half of the world’s iPhones were made at a Foxconn
plant in Zhengzhou, China, where the venture received massive subsidies from the local and
provincial government（Barboza, ２０１６）. The aggregate evidence on domestic employment
loss and hollowing out in the United States was not straightforward. Longitudinal research
has not generally supportive of political rhetoric on the major threats to domestic employ-
ment（Harrison, McMillan and Null, ２００７）. However there was little doubt that global firms
played a significant role in the widening wealth gaps which became a feature of the second
global economy. Enabled by the rise of theories of shareholder value and the rapid expan-
sion of stock options, chief executives awarded themselves very large remuneration even as
real incomes remained highly subdued, especially in the United States. The second global
economy was also characterized by extensive gaming and outright corporate fraud among
large global corporations, facilitated by the ability to transfer funds through offshore finan-
cial centers such as the Cayman Islands which had opaque reporting requirements（Salter,
２００８; Balleisen,２０１７）.
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Global Business in the Era of New Deglobalization since ２００８
As in the previous era of globalization, a financial crisis provided a massive shock
to the global economy. The world financial crisis of２００８―２００９was itself the result in part of
three decades of the financialization of capitalism, enabled by the deregulation of financial
services industry which had been tightly regulated by most governments between the
１９３０s and the １９７０s. The financial sector represented ８ per cent of US corporate profits in
１９５０. By １９９０ it was ２０ per cent. By ２００３ it was ３４ per cent. Global financial assets rose
from $５６trillion in１９９０to $２０６trillion in２００７. Financialization was accompanied by a num-
ber of financial crises―including currency and stock market collapses in Asia in １９９７ and
the collapse of the US and other stock markets in ２０００―before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers resulted in a full-scale global financial crisis.
The global financial crisis resulted in a severe economic downturn, but more funda-
mentally it provoked a change of sentiment about the benefits of liberal global capitalism.
Policy regimes shifted in a more restrictive fashion towards global firms, especially initially
in financial services. There were no more international agreements to reduce tariffs: the
Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations stalled. Although tariff levels did not rise, gov-
ernments took numerous other protectionist non-tariff measures. After ２００８ there was a
surge in micro-protectionism. There was a widespread adoption of local content rules, public
procurement discrimination against foreign firms, export taxes and quotas, and trade dis-
torting subsidies. One study identified ３，５００ new protectionist events between ２００８ and
２０１６. This policy shift contributed to a significant stagnation in capital and trade flows. The
ratio of world trade to output was basically flat between２００８ and２０１６. FDI flows fell from
a peak of $１．９ trillion in ２００７ to $１．２ trillion in ２０１４（Hufbauer and Jung, ２０１６; Ghemawat
and Altman,２０１７）.
It was within the content of stagnation that a number of populist governments
came to power which looked upon liberal and cosmopolitan capitalism with disfavor and pur-
sued nationalistic agendas. This trend was first evident in emerging markets such as Tur-
key, Thailand and the Philippines, as well as Russia, but subsequently spread to some West-
ern economies characterized by extreme inequality and／or high levels of immigration. Brit-
ain’s decision in２０１６ to leave the European Union, motivated by popular desires to restrict
migrant flows, had the potential to disrupt multinational supply chains in Europe and the
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meltdown of London as the world’s leading global financial center. Donald Trump’s assump-
tion of the US Presidency in the following year was followed by a surge of trade protection-
ist and anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
（TPP）trade agreement and the Paris climate change agreement signed in２０１５.
This political and economic environment rendered international corporate strate-
gies more challenging. Some emerging markets firms which had gone global during the
heady days of the second global economy experienced managerial and financial challenges.
These included Indian companies such as the Tata business group and steel company Arce-
lor Mittal, which struggled to manage acquisitions in major Western and other markets. A
number of globalized Brazilian firms were caught up in a massive corruption scandal which
broke out in the country in ２０１４. However many emerging market businesses emerged as
successful global competitors to Western incumbents.
As in the previous era of deglobalization, global firms sought to accommodate na-
tionalistic governments. In ２０１６ Cisco, which had once dominated internet networking in
China, but whose business had shrunk as the government favored domestic competitors
such as Huawei, merged its China business with the local company Inspur to create a joint
venture. In January２０１７, the public tweets of Donald Trump ahead of his assumption of the
U.S. Presidency, resulted in the Ford Motor Company cancelling plans to build a $１．６billion
automobile manufacturing plant in San Luis Potosi in Mexico. Companies with strong bar-
gaining power sought to negotiate special deals with governments. In ２０１６, following the
Brexit vote, the British government promised the Japanese automobile manufacturer Nissan
special incentives should Brexit negotiations result in trade barriers which would hinder the
company selling into the EU. As institutional structures weakened, global firms sought pro-
tection in special deals with governments.
Conclusion
Business enterprises have been powerful actors in the spread of global capitalism
after １８４０. Emerging out of the industrialized Western economies, global firms created and
co-created markets and ecosystems through their ability to transfer a package of financial,
organizational and cultural assets, skills and ideologies across national borders. They have
been major drivers of trade growth, which they often organized within their own bounda-
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ries. They have been shapers of, as well as responders to, globalization waves over the last
two centuries. There was a great deal of heterogeneity in the organizational forms em-
ployed in global business: indeed, mapping and accounting for such changes should form an
important component of future research agendas.
Global firms were also actors in periodic de-globalization waves. This was because
they functioned as re-inforcers of gaps in wealth and income rather than disrupters of them.
Business enterprises proved disappointing institutions for knowledge and technology trans-
fer. During the first global economy, multinational resource and related investments were
highly enclavist, and embedded in the institutional arrangements of Western imperialism
and autocratic dictators. Western firms reinforced rather disrupted institutional and societal
norms which restricted growth in many countries outside the West. They often functioned,
as a result, as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. In the more recent
globalization era, the strategies of Western corporations have moved far beyond the prac-
tices of the colonial past, but linkages and spillovers to local economies have often been dis-
appointedly low. Their ability, and motivation, to locate value-added activities in the most at-
tractive locations means that they strengthen clustering rather than encourage dispersion of
knowledge. Business historians have concentrated far too much on the drivers of global busi-
ness, and far too little on its impact. The next generation of research should focus far more
on impact, including not only knowledge transfer, but also impact on inequality, gender and
ethnic relations, and environmental sustainability.
Evidently over the course of the second global economy the era when Western and
Japanese business enterprises dominated global markets and innovation began to give way
to one in which they competed as equals in a growing number of industries with firms
whose homes were in China, India, the Arab Gulf and elsewhere. Much more research needs
to be undertaken on the historical origins of this shift. This will require business historians
to shift their focus from the West and Japan. As wealth shifts East and with the consolida-
tion of China as the world’s largest economy, this trend can only accelerate, especially as the
growing fragility of institutional structures in the United States and the EU looks set to fur-
ther weaken the competitiveness of firms based in those regions.
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